Perspective on Propaganda

The Pretoria regime considers propaganda as a vital weapon in its efforts to secure internal and external support for its policies. The perspective was set out by the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Hertzog, when the state broadcasting network for Africans, Radio Bantu, was established:

"The radio is the only way to get through to the Bantu and to reach his soul. It has an important role to play in the creation of good relations and goodwill between white and black ... The establishment of Radio Bantu is an even greater security measure for the country than the police force, and for that reason the whole population must help put it on a sound footing." (Die Transvaler, 4.3.64. Our emphasis)

Today, the regime’s propaganda reaches the furthest corner of our country. Dozens of publications with a total print order of millions are produced annually in all languages. Radio Bantu, which is part of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), broadcasts for over 700 hours weekly in at least seven African languages. Its message is specific: emphasis on language and separate identity, focus on Bantustans and the advantages of separate development in contrast with the 'tribal conflicts' and 'oppression by majorities' in independent African countries, the dangers of 'communism' and of 'the Cubans in Angola'.

The message beamed to whites on different frequencies is also tailored, and according to one of the SABC’s annual reports:

"Because of the dangerous times we live in, the television service made a point of stressing the need for spiritual, economic and military preparedness'.

The regime’s accumulated experience over many years in targeting audiences defined as significant groups in terms of apartheid policies domestically is utilised in its external propaganda which is pursued with systematic purpose, skilful packaging and strategic planning.

In 1974, as the fall of Salazar heralded the impending victories of Frelimo and MPLA, the Minister of Information told the all-white parliament:

"My department will not remain on the defensive — we have now gone over to the offensive. We are now equipped with an area map, so to speak, on which we can intelligently base our strategy, a map which shows up enemy strength and weaknesses and their respective positions."

The implementation of this strategy in propaganda initiatives within South Africa and across the borders is most clearly discerned in the expansion of South African broadcasting over the next few years. In 1974, there were four all-day services in African languages inside South Africa and Namibia. By 1977 there were eleven. In Namibia, the Damara-Nama Service and the Herero Service became all-day services and the areas they covered were in-
creased, and a new Kavango Service was set up. Within South Africa, in the north-east Transvaal, the Tsonga and Venda services became separate and each, together with the North Sotho and Tswana services, became all-day services. Within the Zulu service, there was an expansion of programmes in Swazi and Ndebele. South African border areas and the southern African region emerged clearly as the target area. A Lozi service aimed at eastern Caprivi and Zambia was established, the Portuguese service was expanded and a special weekly programme in Tsonga was aimed at southern Mozambique.

A growing ascendency of the military, of which PW Botha is the civilian voice, has led to even greater stress being laid on propaganda. It has been the oft-stated belief of Magnus Malan and other army chiefs that their victory will depend on 'winning the hearts and minds of the people,' with only 20% of the ultimate victory being provided by military measures.

Their assessment holds true for South Africa and Namibia, and no less so in the regime's war to gain international acceptability for itself and its policies.

**Propaganda as an Instrument of Policy**

Pretoria's propaganda efforts are not confined to a general public relations exercise, but are conceived and planned like a military campaign, as one aspect of the regime's overall strategy for furthering apartheid. The particular image promoted, the proposition put forward, the specific idea being furthered at any time as well as the prioritised targets are dictated by tactical considerations, and can change dramatically as necessity dictates. To concentrate on any of these in isolation carries the danger that counter propaganda would focus on concepts and targets that may have been shifted already, changed their character or be no longer of importance.

Therefore, an *a priori* condition for any successful attempt to counter South Africa's pro-

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**THE TERRORISTS EAT YOUR FOOD**

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**THE S.A. SOLDIER HELPS YOU GROW THEM.**

Crude SADF propaganda for 'winning hearts and minds.'
paganda is an appreciation of the direct relationship between the regime’s propaganda and its objectives, and an understanding of its strategy for survival based on continuing political assessment. Such an assessment would illuminate the propaganda objectives and relate them to specific target countries.

The Apartheid Regime’s Current Objectives and Strategy

A significant section of the Nationalist Party had concluded that apartheid rule could not survive unaltered long before Botha exhorted his supporters to ‘adapt or die.’ Since the 1970s, the regime has not been able to decisively wrest the political initiative away from the people of South Africa and the international forces mobilised in support of their national liberation struggle, amongst whom the Commonwealth has played a positive role. Rather, it has had to continuously react and respond to internal resistance and external pressure.

The sudden conversion to ‘dialogue’ and ‘detente’ in the mid-Seventies was a tactic designed to cope with collapsing Portuguese colonialism. Similarly, the so-called ‘reforms’ in South Africa have been a response to continuing popular resistance, the escalating armed struggle, and mounting international pressure. As the pressures have continued to intensify, the regime has sought to pre-empt for itself the role of recognised initiator and agent of change in our country. But the entire process of articulating change is a defensive stance to protect apartheid, not attack or dismantle it.

The objectives and strategy can be summarised thus:

**Inside South Africa:**

1. The entrenchment of apartheid by:
   - Continued repression to try and undermine the people’s determination to resist and destroy all democratic forces in the country especially the national liberation movement — the ANC.
   - Constitutional and other changes to re-arrange power relationships in the country.
     - The total exclusion of the African majority from the South African polity and the attempt to shift the question of their political and economic rights into considerations of "privileges" that may be extended to "aliens" from the Bantustans.
     - The transfer of effective power to an executive president with non-elective committees dominated by the military and technocrats.
     - The creation of allegedly representative bodies with limited delegated powers which are arranged to ensure continued white domination of decision-making, but which seek to incorporate Coloured and Indian South Africans.

2. The attempted division of the oppressed in order both to weaken united opposition and in the interests of apartheid ideology, and counterposing their interests: permanent urban blacks versus rural based migrant workers; Xhosa versus Venda speakers; Coloured versus African workers etc.


4. Externally there are two objectives:
   - Securing the rejection of the position long established in international law and the practice of the UN, the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and other bodies, that the international community has a responsibility for the elimination of the crime of apartheid and that the people of South Africa are conducting a legitimate struggle for their right to self determination and independence.
   - Obtaining recognition of apartheid South Africa as the de facto regional power with whom the major powers and others have to treat on the basis of accepting that developments in the region are dependent on its acquiescence and solutions subject to its veto; by:
     - Seeking by coercion and aggression to legitimise the extension across its borders of the attempt to destroy the ANC and secure the internal power base.
     - Undermining the SADCC, preventing the consolidation of independence of countries in the region, weakening them by military,
political and economic actions and many-faceted destabilisations, thereby trying to ensure that they are unable to support our national liberation struggle or withstand being incorporated into South Africa's sphere of influence. It should be noted that the regime has not succeeded in destroying the ANC or in preventing support for its objectives, nor have the countries in the region succumbed to Pretoria — though the regime's propaganda has to some extent succeeded in masking these facts.

(c) Preventing the independence of Namibia and maintaining its illegal military occupation.

(d) Providing a base for a renewed imperialist offensive in Africa to roll back the political and economic gains of the last 25 years and firmly establish a lasting neo-colonial control over the continent.

Current Strategy Translated Into Propaganda Objectives

Pretoria's propaganda seeks to throw a veil over this reality and to shift international attention away from what is happening in the country and the region, and to focus it instead on the role of the regime as the reformer in South Africa and the peace monger in the region.

In the past three years in particular, but beginning before that, the major thrust of the regime's propaganda has been on the promotion of PW Botha and his regime as determinedly engaged in the difficult task of changing apartheid — in the face of right wing white opposition and a total onslaught orchestrated by Moscow and implemented by the ANC and its allies.

This has been superimposed on the ongoing propaganda that presents South Africa as the strongest economic and military power in the region, the upholder of western values and civilisation, the staunch opponent of Communism and the bulwark against its infiltration of the Continent, and the strategic ally of the west. Such a magical transformation of the oppressor and liberator and its consequences may appear far-fetched, but the policy of 'constructive engagement' which is based on exactly these premises, as is the policy of at least one member of the Commonwealth. The western media generally presents this version of reality to its public.

The need to eradicate apartheid is transmuted into notions of 'change' and 'reform', and attempts are made to limit our people's struggle within the confines of a civil rights movement. An analogy with the United States was repeatedly drawn by Andrew Young in 1975/76, and recently features in the regime's own propaganda and that of its collaborators. The legal and constitutional differences between the United States and South Africa are blunted by ignoring the fact that black Americans were seeking enforcement of their constitutional right to equality, whereas under apartheid the laws and constitution are themselves the source of inequality and entrench the discriminatory system throughout society. The constitution which denies access to political power to the majority, itself has to be overthrown and the system destroyed through a struggle for national liberation.

Through acceptance of such propaganda, and considering the liberation movement as, at best, peripheral in changing apartheid, we are denied opportunities in the western media to interpret events in our country, put forward our people's perspective or argue the case for sanctions.

A corollary of the presentation of the Pretoria regime as the agent of change is the categorisation of those who oppose Botha and his reforms as 'communists', 'extremists' etc., enemies of the peaceful change inside South Africa and the disrupters of peace in the region. This fits in with the strategy of discrediting the genuine opposition and the ANC in particular. At the same time efforts are made to impose and build up the image of alternative leaders who would support the regime and give credibility to its professions of reformist intent.

By such distortions the regime tries to establish for itself the legitimacy denied it by our people, undermine the recognition of the legitimacy of our people's struggle, and simultaneously to bring the national liberation
movement within the offensive against 'international terrorism.'

The propaganda offensive is designed to bring the following immediate results:

■ 1. To deflect criticism from the regime and its policies. Focussing attention on the regime's intentions rather than on the people of South Africa and their conditions serves to limit consideration of the impact of apartheid policies on them. When the harsh brutality of apartheid does impinge, efforts are made to present them in the context of a society in which major changes are taking place and where upheavals are to be expected. The most recent illustration of this is provided by the comments of Dennis Worrall after the Uitenhage massacres, when he tried to equate those events with the 'incidents' in the United States at the peak of the civil rights struggle. There is, in any case, no longer any defensiveness about apartheid. Not only are the crude racist and theological justifications largely abandoned, but the entire basis of the propaganda is that the regime is foremost amongst the genuine (as distinct from agitational) critics of racial discrimination and brutality and has no intention of perpetuating such a system. In this connection note the comments to this effect of Pik Botha at the United Nations, Brand Fourie in the United States, P W Botha in South Africa and Dennis Worrall in London.

■ 2. To reduce support for international action especially sanctions. Those who continue to collaborate with apartheid can argue that since the regime is 'reforming' apartheid not only are sanctions unnecessary but existing pressure needs to be relaxed by way of encouragement and in order to allow the right-wing internal critics of Botha to be shown the tangible benefits of his policies.

■ 3. To pre-empt control not only of the pace of change but more importantly its content and direction by securing recognition of itself as the reformer and agent of change. Thus the new constitution which excludes all Africans from the political decision making in the country, entrenches white domination and accords perpetual subordinate roles to Coloured and Indian South Africans, was presented and acclaimed in even the 'liberal' western media as 'a step in the right direction,' an 'exercise in power sharing,' and 'a major and courageous step forward.' It was only the total rejection of this reform manifested in the boycott of elections, and in the bloodletting in our townships since, that has led to any significant attempt by the western media to see beyond the propaganda glitter.

■ 4. To gain acceptance and support for its policies, and undermine the International Convention for the Suppression and Elimination of the Crime of Apartheid. While no longer trying to defend overt racism, Pretoria does try and aggressively sell apartheid 'separate development' ideology. Its policies and methods are put forward as the answer to multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-tribal, multi-national societies and countered in particular to the problems faced by ex-colonial countries in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean who have tried to develop on the basis of national unity and nation building.

This aspect of South African propaganda is particularly subversive; it presents a continuing danger to the states neighbouring South Africa which are the major targets, and runs counter to the ethos and underlying principles of the Commonwealth. In March 1961, the leader of a yet to be independent Tanganyika recognised and enunciated the ideological conflict:

"Their (South African) policies are a daily challenge to the basic concept of the Commonwealth. Neutrality is not possible ... Inevitably, therefore, we are forced to say that to vote South Africa in is to vote us out."

True to its principles, the Commonwealth voted South Africa out, and that leader, Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, is today the longest serving Commonwealth leader.

But the insidious propaganda continues, as Pretoria capitalises on the legacy of colonialism and sows new seeds of disunity and subversion within the countries of southern Africa. Its ultimate objective is to weaken its neighbours, subvert the SADCC, increase dependence and facilitate the incorporation of
the region into a South African dominated constellation of states within which its Bantustan creations will find legitimacy.

Propaganda in Practice

*The Instruments:*  
The regime’s propaganda is disseminated through a variety of outlets. Some of these are overtly official agencies, others claiming to be ‘independent’ put out pro-apartheid propaganda. In addition, there is a great deal of propaganda clandestinely initiated by Pretoria, through agencies which it has secretly established or funded.

*Department of Information:*  
Since the National Party came to power it has regularly increased the propaganda budget. From R50 000 per annum in 1945, it had reached R11.8-million by 1975 and 3.5-million by 1976. Following the understate revelation, expenditure is buried in allocations for other ministries and in some secret accounts. For example, a pro-apartheid lobbyist in Washington and former campaign manager for Ronald Reagan, Stuart Spencer, has his salary paid by the SA Defence Force. A ‘special representative’ in Pretoria’s London embassy, Philip Moolman, has been appointed with the responsibility of explaining Pretoria’s sports policy. His work supplements that of the ostensibly independent South African Sports Office established in London last year.

By 1982 the Department maintained offices in at least 18 countries: Austria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States of America. In some countries, such as the USA, offices are located in regional centres as well as the capital.

*Radio South Africa and the External Service of the SABC:*  
The regime is spending R16 million per annum for the External Service of the SABC. It broadcasts for 210 hours per week in the following languages: Bemba, Chichewa, Dutch, English, French, German, Lozi, Portuguese, Spanish, Swahili and Tsonga. Programmes including news and commentary are prepared and beamed specifically to target areas in all continents.

*South African Tourist Corporation (Satour) and South African Airways:*  
Both these organisations are engaged in promoting the country’s policies. They participate in regular area meetings with South African diplomats to consider and assess the local political scene, and its effects on relations with South Africa, and in planning and implementing the necessary propaganda response.

*The South African Foundation:*  
Ostensibly set up by South African business interests, it maintains offices in a number of western countries, namely the USA, France, the United Kingdom and West Germany. These are often manned by ex-diplomats. The Foundation plans seminars, sponsors visits, publishes journals, advocates ‘internal peaceful change’ and the establishment of closer ties. Until it was displaced recently by the regime’s direct efforts, the Foundation was the major promoter of the campaigns against sanctions.

*South African Companies and Multinationals:*  
Many South African companies are themselves multinationals and operate in a number of Commonwealth countries. An important ancillary activity of these companies is making friends and influencing people. They operate in a similar way to the Foundation. They focus their attention on financial interests in the City, Wall Street, the Bourse, etc, and cultivate financial journalists and politicians in particular. Through their public relations departments they release speeches of South African businessmen, about ‘change’, ‘stability,’ economic growth and publish magazines such as *Optima*. Their officials travel to schools to speak on careers, and to universities and institutes of higher learning to recruit staff. Employment and placement offices in most such establishments carry publicity handouts from these companies. In the context of careers
THE FREEDOM CHARTER

We, the People of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know:
that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim
authority unless it is based on the will of all the people;
that our people have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and peace by a form of government
founded on injustice and inequality;
that our country will never be prosperous or free until all our people live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights
and opportunities;
that only a democratic state, based on the will of all the people, can secure to all its birthright without
distinction of colour, race, sex or belief;
And therefore, we, the people of South Africa, black and white together — equals, countrymen and brothers —
adopt this Freedom Charter. And we pledge ourselves to strive together, sparing neither strength nor courage,
until the democratic changes here set out have been won.

THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN!
Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and to stand
as a candidate for all bodies which make laws;
All people shall be entitled to take part in the administration
of the country.
The Rights of the People shall be the same, regardless of race,
colour or sex;
All bodies of minority rule, advisory boards, councils and authorities
shall be replaced by democratic organs of self-government.
ALL NATIONAL GROUPS SHALL HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS!
There shall be equal status in the bodies of state, in the courts and
in the schools for all national groups and races;
All people shall have equal right to use their own languages, and to
develop their own folk culture and customs;
All national groups shall be protected by law against insults to their
race and national pride;
The preaching and practice of national, race or colour
discrimination and contempt shall be a punishable crime;
All harsh and brutal practices shall be set aside.
THE PEOPLE SHALL SHARE IN THE COUNTRY'S WEALTH!
The national wealth of our country, the heritage of all South
Africans, shall be restored to the people;
The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly
industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the
people as a whole.
All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the well
being of the People;
All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to
manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions.
THE LAND SHALL BE SHARED AMONG THOSE WHO WORK IT!
Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all
the land re-divided amongst those who work it or farm it and help
man and humanity;
soil and land hunger;
The state shall help the peasants with implements, seed, tractors
and dams to save the soil and assist the tillers;
Freedom of movement shall be guaranteed to all who
work on the land;
All shall have the right to occupy land wherever they choose;
People shall not be robbed of their cattle, and forced labour and
farm prisons shall be abolished.
ALL SHALL BE EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW!

THERE SHALL BE WORK AND SECURITY!
All who work shall be free to form trade unions, to elect their of
ficers and to make wage agreements with their employers;
The state shall recognise the right and duty of all to work, and to
draw full unemployment benefits;
Men and women of all races shall receive equal pay for equal work;
There shall be a forty-hour working week, a national minimum
wage, paid annual leave, and sick leave for all workers, and mater
nity leave on full pay for all working mothers;
Miners, domestic workers, farm workers and civil servants shall
have the same rights as all others who work;
Child labour, compound labour, the toto system and contract labour
shall be abolished.

THE DOORS OF LEARNING
AND OF CULTURE SHALL BE OPENED!
The government shall discover, develop and encourage national
talent for the enhancement of our cultural life.
All the cultural treasures of mankind shall be open to all, by free ex
change of books, ideas and contact with other lands;
The aim of education shall be to teach the youth to love their peo
ple and their culture, to honour human brotherhood.

liberty and peace;
Education shall be free, compulsory, universal and
equal for all children;
Higher education and technical training shall be opened to all by
means of state allowances and scholarships awarded on the
basis of merit;
Adult illiteracy shall be ended by a mass state education plan;
Teachers shall have all the rights of other citizens;
The colour bar in cultural life, in sport and in education
shall be abolished.

THERE SHALL BE HOMES,
SECURITY AND COMFORT!
All people shall have the right to live where they choose, be decently
housed, and to bring up their families in comfort and security;
Unserved housing space to be made available to the people;
Rented prices shall be lowered, food plentiful and no one
shall go hungry;
A universal health scheme shall be run by the state;
Free medical care and hospitalisation shall be provided for all, with
centralised care for older and young children.

-End-
Let all who love their people and their country now say, as we say here:

'THese FREEDOMS WE WILL FIGHT FOR, SIDE BY SIDE, THROUGHOUT OUR LIVES, UNTIL WE HAVE WON OUR LIBERTY.'

Adopted at the Congress of the People. Kliptown, South Africa, on 26th June, 1953.
and job opportunities apartheid South Africa is promoted.

Publications and Reports from Allegedly Independent Academic Institutions

There are a number of South African organisations which claim to be independent institutions of learning. However, their research and other academic programmes are designed to fit in with state policies and objectives. A number of them have been exposed as creations of the Department of Information to give spurious academic backing to apartheid ideology and Pretoria's foreign policy. Others have willingly allowed their academic reputation and status to be used to cover state operations.

A significant part of nuclear and armaments technology has been transferred to South Africa through exchanges and scientific visits arranged under the auspices of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).

Another Institute claiming academic competence and independence is the Human Sciences Research Council, which undertakes 'research' at the behest of the regime and whose published reports and results are frequently put to its political use.

The regime uses the 'results' of allegedly independent surveys and opinion polls to further its objectives. Much was made domestically and internationally of the findings of the HSRC and other surveys which claimed to have measured significant support for Botha's reforms and the new constitution among Coloured and Indian South Africans. The overwhelming boycott of the elections revealed how false these claims were. Similarly, polls and surveys allegedly showing opposition to disinvestment among the majority of black workers are currently being used in the campaign against sanctions, without any account being taken of the fact that supporting and advocating sanctions is a criminal offence in South Africa.

South African Friendship and Trade Associations in Various Countries, and Associations of Foreign Companies inside South Africa

These associations concentrate on building up powerful lobbies in western countries against effective international action on apartheid.

Covert Propaganda Agencies

The Muldergate scandal gave a glimpse of the scale of South Africa's covert propaganda output and the resources devoted to it. Apart from funding an English language daily in South Africa (The Citizen), purchases of The Observer, Guardian, Washington Star amongst others were attempted. United Press International and ITN were among the regular news channels that were infiltrated.

A number of international magazines were set up or funded, journalists corrupted (some unwittingly), allegedly academic institutions were set up and many existing ones given 'research grants', books were published, films made etc.

It is important to note that the 'scandal' was considered to be not so much that the regime engaged in such activities, but was concerned more with which ministers knew about the activities, to what extent parliament was misled, and who used the covert operations for personal financial and political profit. The events were skilfully exploited by PW Botha to discredit his opponents and assume power.

Under Botha covert operations and activities have not been abandoned but new procedures have been set up to regulate them. External propaganda was placed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and thus was acknowledged as an arm of foreign policy. The funding of information projects deemed to be of a secret or sensitive nature was legitimised by the Information Service of South Africa Special Account Act 1979, which provided for funds to be channelled to a Special Account for Information Services from the Secret Services Account. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, approximately sixty (60) of the former projects were retained. A number have since been added, and covert propaganda operations remain an instrument of apartheid policy.

While it is not uncommon for governments retaining public relations consultants and lobbyists, the manner in which the Pretoria regime uses such agencies brings them within the purview of covert operations. The preparation and
placing of advertisements is usual, but is the least of their functions. The agencies are entrusted with responsibility for planning and implementing campaigns with clearly defined political objectives. Often the fact that they are acting on behalf of the regime is concealed from the public, or South African agents are employed without disclosure.

Despite United States regulations which require agencies and lobbyists to register in whose interests they are acting, there have been attempts to operate clandestinely in that country. Most Commonwealth countries do not have similar legislation and hence South African propaganda is disseminated without indication of its source.

It is interesting to note that the regime is now using foreign advertising and public relations agencies to further its domestic political objectives. Saatchi and Saatchi were retained to run the campaign to secure a 'Yes' vote in the white referendum on the Constitution in 1983.

How South African Propaganda Works
South African propaganda is the combined product of the skilful deployment of various resources, sophisticated public relations techniques, and experience accumulated over more than two decades.

Originally propaganda efforts were concentrated on placing advertisements in the western media, particularly Britain. In 1965 approximately £100,000 was spent in two months for advertising in the British press. Increasingly, however, local and international public relations firms have been retained to plan major campaigns with identifiable immediate and long-term objectives. In 1982/83 more than US$3.5 million was spent on a public relations campaign to prevent the state of Massachusetts legislating in favour of disinvestment. (The campaign failed).

Newspaper advertising is still a major aspect of overt propaganda. The 'untruths' of earlier advertisements have given way to seductive half-truths and omissions.

This external propaganda is also used internally.

Target groups of influential people such as journalists, MPs, academics etc receive personal letters and circulars from Pretoria's embassies, ostensibly providing information. These contain slanted and misleading reports and untrue statements. These targets are frequently invited to South Africa and Namibia, or their visits are 'encouraged and facilitated.' As part of the new tactics the South African regime is increasingly reaching into groups which have demonstrated hostility to apartheid and which take action in support of the struggle. Local Councils in the UK who have named streets or buildings after Nelson Mandela, established relations with the ANC and or taken active steps in the boycott campaign have been sent letters, providing 'facts' and invited to engage in dialogue with the embassy.

Bantustan leaders, urban councillors, Coloured and Indian parliamentarians and other collaborators have been incorporated into the regime's efforts to sell apartheid. They have featured in advertising, especially opposing disinvestment and sanctions and promoting Bantustan 'independence.' Some of them have been made showpiece delegates to the United Nations, sent on promotional tours to Europe, the US and the Far East, and been appointed to diplomatic missions, usually as 'information officers.'

Their views are promoted by the regime and its public relations agencies, frequently by advertising but more importantly by gaining acceptance of them as representative 'leaders' by the western media.

Artists, particularly black ones in plays such as Woza Albert, are encouraged to travel out of South Africa in the west, thus fostering the impression that a degree of freedom and open dialogue exists within the society. This cultural penetration of the western media has been very influential.

Disinformation through the media has been practised on a massive scale as the Muldergate scandal illustrated. Disinformation still operates within the country and externally. For instance, the use of false leaflets inside the country is also reflected outside in the way in which the struggle is both minimised and distorted. Stories are planted of ANC intentions such as massacring white civilians, and
misinformation distributed widely through forged publications allegedly emanating from the ANC.

In the region, South African propaganda radios have been used to sow confusion and undermine independent governments. In addition to the activities of the SABC and Radio RSA, South Africa's bandit instruments are provided with bases and transmitters. Renamo radio was stopped under the terms of the Nkomati Accord. However, South Africa continues to beam 'Radio Truth' into Zimbabwe and 'Voice of the Black Cockerel' into Angola. The BBC Monitoring Service makes such viciously distorted broadcasting available throughout the world, without any indication of its South African origins.

Destructive propaganda pamphlets produced in Britain against Commonwealth countries such as the Seychelles bear all the hallmarks of the anti-communist and crude slurs in which apartheid propaganda specialises. The same kind of stories and destructive negative propaganda against many African countries have been repeatedly published in specialist magazines, targeted on Africa itself.

The negative image of Africa deliberately portrayed by Pretoria is projected further by the location of most western correspondents in Johannesburg, from which base they are responsible for covering southern Africa and sometimes the OAU and other areas, and where their perceptions are influenced by the racist environment. Many of these correspondents use two passports in order to try and conceal their South African residence.

Open propaganda in favour of South Africa is a relatively new phenomenon in Africa. The book, titled *Time to Admit South Africa to the OAU*, was produced in Nigeria. Ambassador Worrell's connection with Nigeria dates back to 1962 when he was attached to the University of Ibadan in Nigeria as a research fellow.

The South African propaganda campaign for Jonas Savimbi has included flying dozens of journalists illegally into Angola for press conferences designed to confuse the issue of Pretoria's war against the government of Angola, which is partly waged through Unita. South Africa's propaganda against the MPLA has been a crude and more open version of the negative propaganda that has been systematically fed to the western press about 'incompetent, corrupt' black governments over many years. Its propaganda efforts on behalf of Jonas Savimbi have included his much publicised presence at the swearing in of PW Botha as President, and have been designed to open the floodgates of recognition for Unita.

The regime's propaganda is a significant factor in imposing on the consciousness of the western world a negative picture of the African Continent. The predilections and prejudices of much of the western media allow such distortions of the Continent's reality to go virtually unchallenged. The acceptance of Pretoria and the 'normality' of diplomatic relations with it, symbolised by the invitations and hospitality extended to Botha last year, encourage the very image of itself that the apartheid regime seeks to promote, illustrating the political strategy of the regime as well as the integration of propaganda within it.

**Recommendations**

The campaign to counter propaganda emanating from Pretoria would have to be devised on the basis of resources and facilities available. We would like at this time to make some general comments on such a campaign.

1. As we have indicated in this study, South African propaganda is the product of a carefully planned strategy for the survival of apartheid. Counter-propaganda will have to be based, not merely on a monitoring of the propaganda of the regime, but, more importantly, on an on-going assessment of its political strategy. The promoting of particular images or propositions are dictated by tactical requirements. To be effective, counter-propaganda will have to focus not simply on these projections, which may be transitory, but will need to deal at a more fundamental level with the regime's basic objectives.

Those responsible for the technical implementation will have to be given this political direction in order to enable them to maximise
the effectiveness of the Commonwealth initiative.

2. It is incorrect to assume that the major part of Pretoria's propaganda is still directed towards Britain and the United States. Muldergate revealed the importance of Europe, and the propaganda offensive in Africa has grown enormously. The Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean have also been recipients. The Commonwealth initiative needs to widen its target area to cover these too.

3. The projection of South Africa as part of the white western world rather than a part of Africa, which it is, sometimes invades apartheid propaganda. The situation is seen with the perspective of a 'liberal white' and therefore the image presented is distorted and defined in the terminology: e.g. presenting aspects of our struggle as 'unrest', 'disturbances', 'violent confrontations', 'South Africans as white', etc.

The regime's propaganda tries to set such parameters, within which South African society is to be perceived and projected. It therefore raises issues which are irrelevant and which should be treated as such. For example: If Africans in South Africa were better off than elsewhere in Africa; if there were more restrictions on civil liberties in country A or B in Africa, than in South Africa, if South Africa had the 'freest' press on the Continent, would apartheid be justified?

Historically, the Commonwealth has set out its opposition to apartheid as an abhorrent system which violates its principles. It is on this basis that its propaganda counter offensive has to be conducted. Apart from the dissipation of effort that rebutting such irrelevancies would entail, it would effectively amount to preparation of league tables of African countries on the basis of whose citizens were 'more free', or 'better off.' Such exercises are in line with Pretoria's propaganda efforts, and would in no way contribute to countering them.

4. We hope that the Commonwealth will not only speak in support of our people, but will provide an opportunity for us to speak for ourselves.

We suffer, with most Commonwealth countries, from the reluctance of the western media to acknowledge that our people are able to describe their conditions, articulate their aspirations and interpret developments in our country. It is a form of racism that sees 'western experts' as the only ones capable of doing so. In the case of South Africa, this is reflected in the consistent use of 'liberal' whites in preference to the journalists who are committed to the liberation struggle.

In the coverage of events in our country in March, and the debate about sanctions and disinvestment in the media, the ANC was excluded though we initiated the demand for the total isolation of apartheid South Africa. Interpretation of events in our country was confined to western correspondents in South Africa, foreign 'experts' or the London correspondents of the white-owned South African press.

Conclusion
The African National Congress offers its cooperation to Commonwealth countries and the Commonwealth Secretariat in carrying out the New Delhi mandate. We will be pleased to assist in the process of assessing the regime's political strategy and monitoring its propaganda, as well as in the planning and preparing of material for dissemination by the Commonwealth.

We look forward to establishing closer working relations with the Commonwealth in the endeavour to achieve our common objectives.