Identity documents of S.A. soldier, killed by Angolan troops in South African attack on Cuamato, Southern Angola.

contribution to the African peoples' struggle against colonialism, racism and apartheid.'

The statement notes that the presence of Cuban forces in Angola has been made the subject of slanderous and malicious propaganda by the imperialists, particularly the Americans who are shamelessly trying to link it with the Namibian independence process as a way of impeding the implementation of resolutions already adopted by the United Nations'.

Recalling that in October 1975, 'the United States government launched the South African army against Angola', the statement continues: 'In less than twenty days, South African troops had advanced more than 700 km inside Angolan territory. Meanwhile, from the north foreign regular forces and mercenaries were advancing threateningly close to the capital. It was at that moment that President Agostinho Neto requested Cuba's military cooperation'.

The statement goes on to reveal that 'only one month after the expulsion of the racist South African troops (March 1976), the governments of Angola and Cuba agreed on a programme for the progressive reduction of those forces on 22 April 1976. In less than a year, the Cuban military contingent was decreased by more than a third, but this process was halted as a result of further external threats to Angola.'

In May 1978, South African forces attacked deep inside Angola, killing more than 600 Namibian refugees - mostly women and children - at Kassings. At the same time, there were paratroopers from NATO member countries on Angola's northeast border. All this 'meant a grave threat to Angola and made it imperative that the Cuban military forces remain with the material needed to ensure its security and territorial integrity'.

In mid-1979, the statement goes on to reveal, the Angolan and Cuban governments 'agreed to start to carry out a further programme for the gradual reduction of Cuban forces'.

Intensified South African aggression again halted this process. Indeed, in September 1979 there were large-scale racist attacks against Kunene and Huila provinces. It was in that month that South African planes bombed and partially destroyed the Madeiras da Hulla furniture factory in Lubango and landed troops on the Serra da Leba highway in Huila Province, machine-gunning the occupants of cars driving back to Lubango from Mocamedes on a Sunday afternoon. A stretch of the Lubango-Mocamedes railway was blown up and bridges destroyed. In Kunene Province, villages were attacked and schools and shops destroyed.

The Angolan-Cuban statement emphasises: This shows that the implementation of the programme for the gradual reduction of Cuban forces in the People's Republic of Angola has on several occasions been hampered by constant and criminal acts of aggression against Angola'.

It goes on to say that the presence of Cuban forces 'caused by the external aggression perpetrated by racist and fascist South African troops, in close alliance with the United States of America, constitutes an absolutely sovereign and legitimate act by both countries and, therefore, is in no way related to the problem of Namibia'.

It points out that the strict fulfilment of UN Security Council resolution 435/78, leading to 'the establishment of a truly independent government and the total withdrawal of the South African forces of occupation beyond the Orange River, which will substantially decrease the dangers of aggression against Angola' would lead the Angolan and Cuban governments to study the resumption of the programme for the withdrawal of Cuban forces over a period of time agreed upon by both governments'. The withdrawal of the Cuban forces would take place 'on the sovereign decision of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, once there is no longer any possibility of aggression or armed invasion' and the Government of Cuba will fulfil without any hesitation any decision taken by the sovereign Government of the People's Republic of Angola on the withdrawal of the said forces'.

It is important to quote this statement at some length. Not only does it reveal the persistent efforts of both Angola and Cuba to reduce the number of Cuban troops in Angola, and the way South African
Sirs, please, you must know that my name is always spelled like this...

aggression has hindered this, but it clearly establishes that the troops will go on Angola's sovereign decision. Sovereignty is the key word here. Cuba and Angola—both members of the Non-Aligned Movement—respect each other's sovereignty. The United States, allied with the Pretoria apartheid regime, respects the sovereignty of no country. But those bastions of reaction in the world are making a sad mistake if they believe they can set back the clock and halt the independence process, particularly in Southern Africa, where complete freedom is merely a question of time.
Indignant liberals recently editorialised their regret that the chief of the fascist South African Defence Forces (SADF) “went beyond his proper function as a military officer” by supporting Botha’s so-called reform programme. The SADF they said “should be above the political battle” while at the same time calling on them for a “massive infusion of manpower into the national service system to safeguard life and property against the growing threat mounted by urban guerrillas”.

These mouthpieces of the white opposition representing liberal ‘monopoly capital are caught up in a contradictory situation. On the one hand supporting massive militarisation to protect life and property— in other words the existent economic order i.e. apartheid monopoly capitalism. On the other hand they see the need to formulate some sort of appeasement to provide a ‘political future’ for the African population.

In order to achieve an ‘appraisal’, the liberal idea is to have a strong ‘apolitical’ military/police apparatus to halt or contain any radical revolutionary forces which threaten their plans for reforms and ‘evolutionary’ social change within a capitalist liberal-democratic state.

But these liberals have missed the boat. They have been blinded by the illusion of democratic institutions in South Africa for a long time. The charade has now been finally played out with the whites-only parliament well and truly relegated to its real nature, a mere decoration. Real power now resides in the State Security Council and with the military institution.

Total Strategy

Structural changes to the fascist apartheid state have been far reaching since Botha took power. These changes were necessary as part of the regime’s preparation for intensified military action in defence of apartheid. They involve increased centralisation of government and the widening of military control over the whole state apparatus.

To popularise the rise of the military, the regime has played on the term ‘total strategy’ which reflects their policy spelt out in the 1977 Defence White Paper: “the resolution of a conflict in the times in which we live demands interdependent and co-ordinated action in all fields—military, psychological, economic, political, sociological...”.

‘Total strategy’ provides the rationale for military control over the strategic sector of the economy — the military-industrial complex. As General Malan stated: “Total strategy should encompass the state, the private sector, diplomacy, commerce, industry and organisations like Armmcor, the Council for Scientific and Industrial research and the Human Sciences Research Council”.

State Security Council

The streamlining and rationalisation of apartheid policies is being initiated, developed and controlled by a highly centralised military-controlled power base. The embodiment of this power lies in the State Security Council (SSC). The SSC...
has become the major decision-making body within the whole state apparatus thus reducing the status of the Cabinet. More important is that the whites-only Parliament has become a mere decoration, serving mainly as a talking-shop where SSC decisions are rubber-stamped.

This increase in executive power for the racist Prime Minister and the military is reflected in the composition of the SSC which comprises the following key members:

Prime Minister — P.W. Botha, ex Defence Minister.
Minister of Defence — Gen. M. Malan, ex Chief of SADF.
Chief of the SADF — Gen C.L. Viljoen.
Minister of Police — L. le Grange.
Minister of Justice — H. Coetsee, ex Dep. Defence Minister.
Chief of National Intelligence Service — N. Barnard.
Minister of Foreign Affairs — R.F. Botha.
Secretary of the State Security Council — Gen. A. van Deventer (SADF).

The composition of the SSC shows the role of the military/police security apparatus in the political decision-making process. The generals are also the vital force behind the whole restructuring of the state. General Malan outlined the component parts of the 'Management Mechanisms of the National Security System' as follows:

a) the State Security Council, headed by the Prime Minister;
b) the work committee of the SSC;
c) the security planning branch of the office of the Prime Minister;
d) a number of interdepartmental committees; and
e) a number of joint management centres, as well as the Department of National Intelligence to provide the essential strategic background.

National Security Doctrine

What is the purpose of the above structures? A. Mattelart, a theorist who has studied the phenomena of militarisation and the National Security State in Latin America provides some insight:
"This National Security Doctrine, which presides over the break-up of the democratic and republican state, thus reversing the balance of power established by the constitution, is concretely expressed by the hegemony of the military-police machinery within the entire state apparatus. The executive power is transferred to the state National Security Council upon which the intelligence agencies, and the so-called 'political' police, such as the Chilean DINA are directly dependent. These agencies answer only to the Head of State, and their mission is based on three objectives: 1) to coordinate the activities of the other intelligence branches of the Security Forces 2) to carry out arrests that are related to internal state security 3) to provide the Head of the Security Council with information on every aspect of daily life that is necessary for planning, development and national security. In point of fact, this last clause legitimises the power of control which the state intelligence apparatus exercises over the other State organs. Legislative power, if not simply abolished becomes a mere decorative element. The judiciary system can only handle unimportant cases, since exceptional jurisdiction protects the order defined by national security. The changeover to a new state of law, which has since become classic, is precisely what justifies or attempts to justify, the expressions of 'State of War', 'State of Emergency' etc. This extra-constitutional legislation eliminates or controls political parties, the press and trade unions, and abolishes all basic social, civil and political rights."

This theory, developed out of the experience of Latin America has obvious relevance to South Africa.

The Reasons behind Militarisation

What brought about the need for increased militarisation of the South African state? Addressing the Institute of Strategic Studies in Pretoria in 1980, General Malan said: "The events in Angola in 1975/76 focussed the attention on the urgent necessity for the State Security Council to play a much fuller role in the national security of the Republic than hitherto. One of its first actions following the Angola campaign was to appoint an interdepartmental committee to go urgently into the matter of formulation of strategy on the national level as well as the organisational structures necessary for the purpose."

This tells us a number of things about National Security. First it was required as a response to the dramatic regional shift in the balance of power against the fascist regime; with momentous victories of the national liberation struggles in Angola and Mozambique and later Zimbabwe; the defeat of the fascist expeditionary force in Angola at the hands of MPLA and Cuban forces. In occupied Namibia, the seventies were marked by a wave of strikes and escalation of the armed struggle led by SWAPO. In South Africa the 1970's was a period of mounting black working class struggle culminating in the 1976 uprising and the launching of the urban guerrilla campaign by Umkhonto we Sizwe, military wing of the ANC.

The inadequacy of the police and judicial repressive machinery in attempting to implement the fascist policies of ruthlessly suppressing the black majority had already begun to emerge in the decade of the 60's. UNITY IN ACTION, an ANC publication states: "The South African fascist regime was on the one hand constantly strengthening its defences and extending its horizons of economic domination and political influence well beyond our borders. On the other hand the regime was desperately striving to demoralise, divide and weaken our people, to intimidate and corrupt them into submission, while trying to stamp out and prevent the growth of a revolutionary movement in the country by every means at its disposal."

"The enemy's basic vulnerability was the reason for its utmost 'vigilance' and justification for its aggressiveness. Its discovery in Rivonia of large-scale and advanced preparations for armed struggle and its disastrous contact with ANC fighters in Zimbabwe in 1967 were for him a frightening revelation of the danger he..."
faces. Both events stung him into panic stricken preparations for war on all fronts and at all levels. The racist government’s perspective and preoccupation with the fear of insurrection and guerrilla warfare, coupled with the hysteria that gripped the fascist regime during the post-Rivonia period and the armed clashes in Zimbabwe accelerated the counter-insurrectionary tactical needs of the fascist regime. The enemy was afraid of the revolution; he had seen the writing on the wall", (p.58)

The role of US imperialism in National Security also needs to be stressed. General Malan himself underlined the importance of “a resolution of the National Security Symposium held in 1977”, which provided the theoretical impetus for the application of the National Security Doctrine to South Africa. This was the first symposium of the Institute of Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria (ISSUP). ISSUP is a government think-tank set up in 1974 “to ensure both the security and constructive role of South Africa” and in doing this to “document strategic questions, conflict strategies, co-operative and negotiating strategies, the role of violence, arms and arms control, military technology, alliances etc.”. It also has “specific regional interests including Southern Africa, the Southern Atlantic and Indian Ocean regions.”

Of the eight speakers at this symposium, two were US Army Colonels. A Colonel Barber who “held a variety of posts during his Marine Corps service, primarily in operations and training intelligence and psychological operations. Served as Psychological Operations Officer in Vietnam.”, and a Colonel Katz, who “who responsible for work in the military use of psychological methods in the US Army, and worked for the US Information Agency in Vietnam.”

Another important speaker was South African Lieutenant-General Dutton who was then Chief of Staff, Operations responsible for Namibia. (He is now South African Ambassador to fascist Chile).

Analysis of the Latin American situation have looked at the various forms of military states imposed in that continent, and have come to the conclusion that Military Forces in Latin America are dependent on basic theoretical nuclei such as the Pentagon, as well as French and Brazilian Generals who have written theoretical works on National Security.

The historical experience of the United States led to the elaboration of the National Security Doctrine. The post-war US Security Act of 1947 put this doctrine into practice. In order to prevent demobilisation from creating the same crisis situation of the pre-war years, the military-industrial complex decided to maintain the high pressure achieved by exceptional wartime mobilisation. National Security justified war-time institutions and made their war priorities the same as peace priorities. The Bill provided for “integration of foreign policy with national policy, the integration of our civil economy with military obligations,...for continual advance in the field of research and applied sciences.”

The National Security Doctrine is therefore primarily a war doctrine. The traditional role assigned to the military as an 'apolitical' instrument of the state ceases to exist. The Doctrine allows the military to gain paramountcy and control of the whole state apparatus.

There is a strong line of continuity between all of the fascist military regimes in different parts of the world. Their emergence is in keeping with the ongoing crisis of the world capitalist economy. Their existence is dependent upon imperialism which is faltering in the face of the ascendency of popular movements and national liberation struggles in various parts of the globe. The militarisation of the State should be considered as a violent phase in the attempt to ensure the survival of the imperialist monopoly capitalist system.
Writing in the Voice Weekly (April 8-14th, 1981) Mothobi Mutlooa commented that there is confusion in South Africa over the national anthem Nkosi Sikelel' Afrika. Not only that. He also remarked about what he called "a disgusting development — its debasement by some of us indigenous people of South Africa."

In short, treating it as if it was a pop or disco tune, to be danced or drunkenly sung to as soon as meriment, or, "the waters of immortality had run amok in our blood systems".

"And for this, the gods of Africa are surely going to punish us — and thoroughly too."

This alone makes it imperative for Sechaba to investigate — albeit briefly — the origin of Nkosi Sikelel' Afrika and the role it has played (and continues to play) in the process of national unity. In this year of Unity in Action there is more reason for that because the acceptance and adoption of Nkosi Sikelela by the ANC as a national anthem meant the strengthening and reinforcement of what we call a loyalty of a new type.

Another reason for our concern is given by Mutlooa in the said article: "Let alone the fact that our disrespect for the Sacred Hymn of the Dispossessed Owners of our Homeland, South Africa is making its composer, Enoch Mankayi Sontonga turn in his grave at Brixton Cemetery, Johannesburg, where he is believed to have been buried."

Who was Enoch Mankayi Sontonga? Born in Lovedale, Cape Province, in 1860 Enoch Mankayi Sontonga left school at an early age and went to live in Johannesburg where he was employed in various occupations. He was a christian and endowed with a wonderful voice; fond of music and made good use of it in church. He wrote both the music and the words. His compositions were sung in church and concerts to help the church raise funds. "His songs became very popular in the whole of Johannesburg and later throughout the country", writes T.D. Mwee Skota. This is confirmed by D.D.T. Jabavu who says Sontonga "had a gift for song, and constantly composed pieces, words and music, for the use of his pupils at public entertainments" (Sontonga was a church school master at Nancefield, now Pinville Zone Seven).

In 1897 he composed Nkosi Sikelel' Afrika which was publicly sung in 1899 at the ordination of the Reverend M. Boweni — a Methodist priest. Sontonga is said to have composed Nkosi Sikelela just opposite Musi High School in Pinville. It was in Tonic Sol-fa. He had just founded a church choir in the African Presbyterian church to sing in the church to which he belonged.

The occasion was one of wide joy but the composition was inspired by a depressed heart and the refrain testifies to a somewhat melancholy strain, says D.D.T. Jabavu: The Blacks around Johannesburg were, at the time, far from happy by reason of straitened circumstances and because they felt they were not getting a square deal from powers that be. We should remember that this was just before the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) in which the interests of the Africans were totally disregarded. Those days Nkosi Sikelela was commonly sung in African schools. Sontonga's choir
under his conductorship travelled as far as Durban. Rev. John Langalibalele Dube, founder of Ohlahle Training Institution and also Ilanga kaZulu Natal newspaper (later to be the first ANC President-General) was so captivated by Sontonga’s songs, especially Nkosi Sikelela, that he asked for permission to make use of them. This was readily given. That was way back in 1903. Dube’s choir popularised Nkosi Sikelel’Afrika in Natal.

Sontonga died in Johannesburg in 1904 — virtually unsung. His grave is situated at the now all-white Brixton Cemetery. But before he died Sontonga had written a number of pieces in Tonic Sol-far on odd sheets of paper and eventually collected them into an exercise book, with a view to printing them. This valuable exercise book got lost soon after his death “because a friend took it from the widow and disappeared with the original version of the anthem. And it has since not been unearthed”.

The legendary R.T. Cahuza played his role in popularising Sontonga’s songs (including Nkosi Sikelela) through fund-raising concerts. But it was S.E.K. Mqhayi (1875-1945), imbongi yesizwe jikelele (the national poet) who added 7 stanzas to the national anthem with the result that the Xhosa lyrics, with the exception of the first stanza (which was Sontonga’s) was Mqhayi’s version was published in 1927. This was done, according to DDT Jabavu, “with true poetic ability”. Mqhayi, according to A.C. Jordan in his Towards an African Literature was “a man destined to carry the literary tradition into its second phase. Journalist, poet, novelist, biographer, essayist and translator Mqhayi has done more than any other writer to reveal the beauty of Xhosa. He dominated the Xhosa literary scene in this sheet in 1945 and for many years was the model for everybody who tried to write in the language ...

“His contribution to Southern Bantu Literature is easily the largest and most valuable that has hitherto been made by any single writer.”

A look at Mqhayi’s version of Nkosi Sikelela leads one to the conclusion that our forefathers sang with dignity; the lyrics is flowing and the song is a plea, full of humanism and love of people, their well-being and welfare. It is against everything inhuman and anti-popular; a prayer for the people of Africa.

The ANC National Anthem

The song originally intended as a hymn began to be sung in all provinces, gaining recognition as the Steppe’s national anthem. The first verse (Sontonga’s ) has survived as the basis of the popular national anthem. The ANC adopted it in 1925 as its national anthem and all organisations and churches followed suit. It was also at this time that the ANC adopted the black, green and gold colours as national colours. The status and dignity of our national anthem has grown: today the song has become a national anthem of many countries in Africa north of the Limpopo. This is a tribute and monument to Enoch Mankayi Sontonga.

Inside South Africa the song is not only sung in one language — in fact there has developed an adaptation acknowledging the unity of our people. An English translation can only be literal and loses the poetic and melancholic rhythm of the song — this prayer for the people of Africa.

Today Sontonga’s Nkosi Sikelela is closely associated with and symbolises the struggle of our people for a democratic South Africa. It can be heard at protest and solidarity meetings, conferences and worker support concerts throughout the country. People stand at attention, all activity comes to a halt as a sign of respect. They raise their fists throughout the song’s duration and at its ending the people chorus slogans such as “Amandla”, “Maatla”, “Power to the People”. After all, that was what Sontonga had in mind when he composed the song.

In conclusion of his article Mothobi Mutloatse makes an appeal: “... anybody with more information on the history of Sontonga, and the recognition of the Sesotho lyrics of Nkosi Sikelel’Afrika, only has to drop me a line, and then I’d come running. God bless us all in Africa ...”

SECHABA repeats the appeal.

25
U.S. Writers fight for ANC's cause
by Anton Mberi

Writing on the American Writers Congress and the cause of Southern Africa in the Daily World November 20, 1981 (organ of the CPUSA), Anton Mberi states that:

In the midst of the opening day's bedlam and excitement a Black caucus was held. Called by the Black Writers Union, a small, New York based organisation, it was to serve as a vehicle for the Congress' Afro-American delegates to meet and coordinate their concerns and interests prior to the Congress' moving into full swing. Although the majority of Afro-American delegates had not yet arrived at the time of its convening, it was here the problem that would surface on the floor of the plenary session devoted to Resolutions adoptions on Sunday, two days later, began.

Many concerns were discussed at this caucus meeting, but one particular question dominated the caucus' work -- the question of the "language and spirit" contained in the Southern African Resolution submitted to the Congress as a whole by Wesley Brown and June Jordan. This resolution, to be called the Brown resolution here, arose out of their joint work with the Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of Southern Africa, held at Riverside Church, in Harlem, simultaneously with the American Writers' Congress.

The Brown resolution called for the American Writers' Congress to extend
material aid and support to the African National Congress (ANC) and the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO); to join with the Congressional Black Caucus in condemning and opposing U.S. involvement in Southern Africa supportive of apartheid and colonialism; to boycott writers and publishers who, through word or visitation, give support or credibility to South Africa’s apartheid regime; and finally, called on all Congress delegates and participants to work with the ANC and SWAPO, and the International Committee Against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa. Thus, recognizing the main forces participating in the South African and Namibian liberation processes.

The Congress had exchanged delegations and solidarity statements with the Riverside Church Conference, welcoming ANC and SWAPO members to the Congress during its Keynote Address program. Several Congress delegates shuttled back and forth the entire weekend between Congress and the Conference. In other words, working links and expressions of common cause were established between the Congress and the Conference, some of them prior to the opening of both events...

I attended the opening session of the Conference, but returned in time to be a part of the caucus meeting at the Congress. It was here, at this meeting Amiri Baraka, poet and playwright, B.J. Ashanti, a local poet, and both members of the Black Writers Union, along with a few others from their group, set out to sever these links and expressions of common cause with the ANC and SWAPO in the Southern African liberation process.

Objecting to the “sectarian” mention of the ANC, in the context of the South Africa’s liberation struggle, they sought to change the “language” and “spirit” of the Brown resolution through a caucus resolution, that omitted all organisational names other than the American Writers Congress, Baraka, B.J. Ashanti and associates moved to eliminate any reference to ANC. With the passage of the caucus resolution, Baraka and associates succeeded by removing the names of all organisations mentioned in the Brown resolution from its wording.

The caucus passed the following resolution: “Be it resolved that the American Writers Congress fully support the liberation struggles of Black and other (meaning Coloreds and Asians in South Africa, and SWAPO in Namibia) oppressed peoples of Southern Africa, and that we join the Black Writers Union in adopting the resolution on Southern Africa as previously submitted (the Brown resolution)". The caucus resolution nonetheless reflected the overwhelming sentiment for support of Southern African liberation. The problem for most of the participants was lack of information about the roles of ANC and PAC in the South African setting, and this
was used by Baraka and associates to achieve their anti-ANC aims.

On Sunday, at the plenary, shouting his narrow nationalism and berating the white Congress participants, Baraka demanded they pass his diluted version of the Brown resolution. Baraka's version would, as achieved in the caucus resolution, omit any mention of the ANC, SWAPO, the International Committee against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa, and the need for the American Writers' Congress to go on record as agreeing to work closely with these organisations to achieve a victory in South African and Namibia.

Rushing the mikes, followed by his associates, Baraka proceeded to dominate the floor, making it next to impossible for anyone else to clarify or identify exactly what the problem was. The chair of the session was white, the majority of the participants were white, Baraka harangued them saying that if they failed to pass his version they would, in keeping with their "whiteness", be taking a position of no support for Southern African liberation. Bedlam ensued. The situation became further ensnared in parliamentary procedure; legitimate grievance became tangled in illegitimate aims ala Baraka.

Utilizing "white liberal guilt" tactics combined with slanders of Wesley Brown, for being "uncompromising and sectarian", and myself for being "dishonest, manipulative and unscrupulous," Baraka and associates succeeded once again in altering the language of a resolution on Southern Africa. The first time it was the caucus, this time it was Brown's resolution.

It was true, Brown and myself, as well as others involved with linking up the Congress with the Southern Africa Conference going on at Riverside Church, refused to "compromise" the truth of ANC and SWAPO roles in the Southern African liberation process. Thus, we could not, of course, in the same breath, support PAC; it was one or the other.

Still, the American Writers' Congress passed the Brown resolution, albeit it with Baraka's diluting "word-magic" language. Suffice it to say, the struggle in South Africa and Namibia are not characterised as "race" struggles, but as anti-imperialist and anti-apartheid. The International solidarity these movements need and are calling for must be on the same basis, anti-imperialist and anti-apartheid.

"Skin-strategies" and "character assassinations" will only serve to weaken the solidarity work we sought to begin among U.S. writers via the Brown resolution and the American Writers' Congress. Such methods, tactics and styles of work will only impede the unity the American Writers' Congress has committed itself to building among all writers. As for Baraka, it is wise to remember that this style of work is part and parcel of his "word-magic" stock in trade.
Book reviews

a) Time is not on our side


This book is a collection of Bishop Desmond Tutu's statements on his — and our — struggle against apartheid and for social justice in South Africa.

In this book Tutu comes across as a very religious person, honest and dedicated to the cause of his people — the African people. He goes beyond that and sees the struggle as that of both black and white:

"The darkest hour, they say, is before dawn. We are experiencing the birthpangs of a new South Africa, a free South Africa where all of us, black and white together will walk tall, where all of us, black and white together will hold hands as we stride forth on the Freedom March, to usher in the new South Africa". (p. 64)

His message to the Whites is reminiscent of the ANC calls during its days of legality:

"We are committed to black liberation, because thereby we are committed to white liberation. You will never be free until we blacks are free. So join the liberation struggle. Throw off your lethargy, and the apathy of affluence. Work for a better South Africa for yourselves, ourselves and for our children. Uproot all evil and oppression and injustice of which blacks are victims and you whites are beneficiaries, so that you won't reap the whirlwind. Join the winning side". (p.43-44)

Tutu understands very well what he calls the "South African white psyche". He relates a story about when he was flying from Durban and "one of the pretty air-hostesses" approached him to say: "Excuse me, Sir, a group of passengers would like you please to autograph a book for them" (p.53). He was pleasantly surprised and was trying to look suitably modest when she went on to say:

"You are Bishop Muzorewa, aren't you?"

The strength of the book lies in Tutu's understanding and knowledge of African deprivation which is South African reality today. He has travelled widely throughout South Africa. On one of his trips he visited a resettlement camp — this must have been in the Ciskei. He asked a little girl who lived with her widowed mother and sister:

"Does your mother get a pension or grant?"

"No" she replied.

"Then what do you do for food?"

"We borrow food" she replied.

"Have you ever returned any of the food that you have borrowed?"

"No".

"What do you do when you can't borrow food?"

"We drink water to fill our stomachs". (p. 108)

This is happening in a country which is boasting of exporting food.

Tutu has a feel of the changing mood of the people, especially the youth. Writing about the funeral of the Silverton heroes, he says:

"We really have a new breed of black exemplified by the young people who turned up at the funeral of the Silverton gunmen. We of an older generation are on the whole still scared of arrest, of police dogs, of teargas, of prison and of death. But these young people are quite something else. They have experienced it all — yes, they have seen friends, brothers and sisters die and they are no longer scared. They are just determined. They are determined
that they are going to be free, they and their reluctant cowed parents. They have, they believe, sat for too long, listening night after night to the stories of their parents’ daily humiliations just because they were black. They have decided that enough is enough and so they are people with iron in their souls. They are determined with a new kind of determination. Most of them believe that the goal which they are determined to reach — true liberation in what they call a united Azania — can come only with bloodshed and violence. They say this, and that is what is so shocking, in a matter of fact kind of way, for they say their leaders have tried everything peaceful and they have nothing to show, for their efforts...

"The determination of these young people has rubbed off on their parents who are becoming more politicised by so many things..." (p.90)

Tutu’s philosophy is based on his desire to invoke the positive aspects of African tradition — ubuntu — and his deep religious feelings. He is no political predikant — he says — but a man moved by his faith and belief that God is on our side — on the side of justice, of peace, of reconciliation, of laughter and joy, of sharing and compassion and goodness and righteousness”. (p.44)

His religion is not simply metaphysical but is closer to what Latin Americans call theology of liberation. Tutu does reflect and express the anger and ideas which are current and prevalent in black thinking in South Africa. He has this to say about capitalism:

"I loathe capitalism because it gives far too great play to our inherent selfishness. We are told to be highly competitive, and our children start learning the attitudes of the rat race quite early. They mustn’t just do well at school — they must sweep the floor with their rivals. That’s how you get on. We give prizes to such persons, not so far as I know to those who know how best to get on with others, or those who can coax the best our or others.

"We must delight in our ulcers, the symbols of our success...

“Capitalism is exploitative and I can’t stand that”. (p.100)

In this book Tutu deals with many aspects of our reality: religious, economic, social and political life. He writes on detention without trial, banned people, urban unrest, Mangaliso Sobukwe, Steve Biko etc. In his piece on “Free Mandela” he says “...there is going to be a black Prime Minister in South Africa within five-to-ten years ... And we need Nelson Mandela, because he is almost certainly going to be the first black Prime Minister” (p.36).

On the question of the enforcement of a black “buffer middle class” between the whites and the have not blacks; people “who will become vociferous supporters of the status quo that gives them so many privileges”, Tutu is of the opinion this will change the nature and character of the struggle: “It will then cease being just a race question. It will have become a class struggle” (p.110).

Tutu’s book expresses the indomitable will of our people, all of them including the religious section, to be free from national oppression and economic exploitation. The role of the Christians in this struggle is growing. Tutu is not an advocate of armed struggle, he is a man of God, a man of peace. He feels there is still room and time for negotiation. The racist government must negotiate now with our leaders on Robben Island and in exile. He is convinced that struggle — a peaceful one — will bring about changes and calls for a united front of all anti-racists: freedom is indivisible. Blacks must unite because they are all oppressed. You are either oppressed or privileged: “You can’t have a woman who is half pregnant” (p.93).

F.M.
b) Namibia: The army of occupation


This long overdue booklet, which details the Pretoria regime’s military occupation of Namibia, has been produced by the International Defence and Aid Fund with assistance from the Committee on South African War Resistan. It is the tenth publication in the IDAF ‘Fact Paper’ series.

Although most of the information in the booklet is drawn from the press and other published sources, it provides for the first time a detailed overall picture of the extent of the apartheid regime’s military operations in Namibia. Its factual, statistical approach does not hide the horror of the racist occupation. The facts speak for themselves: Over 80% of the Namibian people subject to martial law; one out of ten Namibians driven into exile; 100,000 occupying troops making Namibia the most militarized country in the world.

The first two chapters deal with the history of Pretoria’s military build-up in the territory. As in the case in South Africa, the racist regime has always relied on military might to maintain its oppressive rule. Since 1915, when Pretoria took over Namibia from the German colonists, resistance has been brutally crushed by armed forces.

But it was during the general strike of 1971/2 that the militarization drive was most dramatically stepped up, and the South African Defence Force took over counter-insurgency duties from the SA Police. The victory of the MPLA in Angola some two years later led to a rapid intensification of the liberation struggle. The SADF responded by pouring in troops, attacking Angola, imposing martial law and building huge military bases in the north.

Today a bewildering array of military and para-military forces are deployed against the Namibian people, particularly in the ‘operational areas’ in the north. Two chapters of this booklet are dedicated to unravelling this complex structure, and some excellent research work has been done in exposing the strengths, tasks and command structures of the numerous army and police units. The ‘special units’ which are responsible for much of the torture, brutality and terrorism in Namibia and Angola are described — the ‘Koevoet police unit’, the mercenary 32 ‘Buffalo’ Battalion, the so-called ‘UNITA’ forces which in effect function as part of the SADF, the ill-disciplined and ill-trained ‘Ovambo Home Guards’, and racist South Africa’s equivalent of Ian Smith’s Selous Scouts, the Reconnaissance Commandos. Special attention is also given to Pretoria’s strategy of incorporating black Namibians into some of these units and of trying to set them up as a ‘national army’. But the controlling hand of the racists is evident in all these fruitless attempts to turn the Namibian independence struggle into a civil war.

The Chapter dealing with ‘The War’ is the least useful, as it relies on heavily-censored press reports — apart from the occasional snippets of information gleaned from deserters from the racist forces.
However, even the skimpiest reporting of SWAPO’s armed struggle shows how the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) has been engaging in ever-more successful attacks against the occupying forces. The SADF has been able to respond only by resorting to full-scale terrorism. The growing incidence of murder, rape and torture by the South African forces is pointed out, and any attempts to win the ‘support’ of the local population by ‘control of hearts and minds’ policies have been all but abandoned in the operational areas.

The remainder of the booklet is taken up with a summary of SADF aggression against Angola and other front-line states, and an analysis of the implications of the continuing racist military build up for any Namibian independence negotiations.

One major criticism needs to be made. The maps, which are an essential adjunct to the text are shoddily produced and in places inaccurate. However, they do not detract greatly from this otherwise highly informative publication, the necessary complement to an earlier Fact Paper, ‘The Apartheid War Machine’.

To all who are interested in the liberation of Namibia this book is a useful reference work, and the descriptions of the brutal divisive and militaristic strategies of the racist forces in Namibia should be of interest to all engaged in the fight against apartheid and colonialism.

G.C.
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