Introduction:

The first three days of December were marked by an upsurge of violence on the East Rand. Phola Park which had been quite since the initial outbreaks of violence on the Reef became the main target.

A likely explanation is the move by many people from Zonk’Izizwe to Phola Park in late November after Inkatha members gained control of the squatter camp. Prior to this influx of people from Zonk’Izizwe, Phola Park had been relatively quite.

The Board has established that at least three thousand people from Zonk’Izizwe have temporarily settled in Phola Park.

The South African Police (SAP) claim that the "flare-up" on the East Rand was mainly due to the rents and service boycott in the area which led to the electricity supply being turned off.
They allege that "Zulus", who had been paying their rent and service charges, were resentful of the fact that their services had been terminated. This, they claim, led to the initial outbreak of violence, which then spread to other areas.

The Board has not been able to substantiate this claim. The sophistication of the attacks continued through December 1990. Smaller, heavily armed groups were mainly responsible for the carnage. On visiting Phola Park the Board established that most of the injured and dead had been shot rather than stabbed or hacked. The increased use of sophisticated firearms particularly AK 47's has prompted the Board to investigate the possible origin of these weapons.

The Board has more detailed documents related to the areas covered in this report which can be made available to interested parties on request.
1. PHOLA PARK

In early December, the IBIIR took several statements from people in Phola Park, many of whom alleged that Zulu speaking people travelled from Zonk'Izizwe squatter camp in Katlehong to attack them.

It is believed that on 2/12/1990 residents of Thokoza went to Phola Park and asked for assistance to protect themselves from an impending Inkatha attack. In the ensuing battles, 54 lost their lives. Many of the statements point to the SAP being actively involved in the conflict. In the Weekly Mail of 7/12/90 Civic Associations of Southern Transvaal (Cast) secretary, Sam Ntuli, says he witnessed on the first day (1/12/90) of renewed fighting in Thokoza, men in plainclothes heading from a hostel adjacent to the Thokoza police station, collecting arms from the police station and driving off in a Casspir and a mini-bus towards the "battleground".

Ntuli stressed that the men were carrying "Long and short guns" and were not in uniform. A spokesperson for the East Rand police, Captain Ida van Zweel, said police had last been
accommodated in the hostel neighbouring the police station "sometime back" and had since moved from there. The Board has collected several statements corroborating the presence of a mini-bus in the attacks of 2/12/1990 in Thokoza.

The violence in Phola Park was characterised by attackers looking for Xhosa speaking people to attack. This once again raised the spectre of ethnicity and what role it has played in the Reef violence. While analysts and some political organisations have stressed that the conflict is fuelled by a "third force", one should not lose sight of the fact that people on the ground engaged in the day to day battles on the Reef, often speak of the conflict as "war between the Zulus and Xhosas". Possibly, then, tribal consciousness is a proximate - or subjective cause of a portion of the violence. Here one can point to the distribution of pamphlets which manipulate Zulu consciousness. Thus, what really needs to be looked at is the objective cause, the cause that has its being in active politics.

Following the violence on the East Rand a curfew was imposed on 3/12/1990 in Thokoza, Katlehong and Vosloorus.
2. SACC TOUR

The IBIIR prepared a briefing document for the South African Council of Churches tour of East rand townships on 12/12/1990. Many dignitaries attended as well as the American ambassador to South Africa, Mr William Swing. The tour was also attended by high ranking members of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The Chief Minister of KwaZulu, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, was invited but he declined the invitation saying he had not been "fully consulted". He did however, on the same day tour the east rand townships with law and Order Minister, Adriaan Vlok. Following Buthelezi’s early morning tour to Thokoza, particularly to the hostels, the SACC delegation encountered hostility when it tried to enter the hostels. The delegation was turned back by an aggressive group of Inkatha supporters and were not allowed to drive past the hostel to the Natalspruit Hospital.
3. BEKKERSDAL

The political in fighting in Bekkersdal continued in December. Differences between rival political factions seem to account for at least some of the violence in the area. At least 33 people lost their lives in Bekkersdal in December, bringing the death toll in the area since November to 63.

There have also been allegations that police in collusion with "Ma-Russians", a blanket-clad group of bandits, have attacked homes and shacks in the area. The violence led to taxi drivers staging a one day strike on 10/12/1990 and they also signed a petition which was handed in at the Westonaria police station in protest against the killing of people and the burning of houses.

4. VIGILANTE ATTACKS

Activists in Khutsong township near Carletonville allege that the police have been conducted a reign of terror in the township exploiting divisions and harnessing a vigilante group called "Zim-Zims". Police however claim that the violence and loss of life is caused by gangster rivalry.
("Zim-Zims" is a term used to describe members of Azapo and Azasm because of all the "isms" in their ideology.)

5. TOWNSHIP VIOLENCE:

The South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) reports that 20 people on average have died a day in fighting on the Reef since August 1990, twice the daily average for the country as a whole. The SAIRR claims that in South Africa an estimated 3,460 people died in 1990 alone, compared to 2,847 people in Northern Ireland since the conflict began there in 1969.

Allegations of police partiality continued, with both the ANC and the Weekly Mail claiming they have video evidence clearly showing the SAP taking sides in the East Rand violence. The Weekly Mail published two series of pictures: one showing police treating two seriously wounded men, and then abandoning them, without any apparent reason to be killed by a group of hostel dwellers; the other showing police watching passively as the "impi" advances through Thokoza, and only intervening when armed "comrades" repelled the "impi".
In both cases the SAP has issued statements refuting the claims and saying that the videos in question were conveniently edited.

5.1 OTHER INCIDENTS

The names and addresses of this week's (1, 2 and 3 December 1990) massacre victims in Thokoza were read off a death list by bandits who moved from door to door shooting and hacking their way through the East Rand township. The detailed nature of the list suggested that the organisers of the carnage had access to names and addresses of every resident in the township. Some residents have gone as far as alleging that the council and other state agencies may have helped compile the list.

Residents said the latest massacre differed from previous attacks in that the raiders were heavily armed with AK 47 rifles and assegais and had little difficulty in locating their targets. (New Nation 7/12/90).
Five bodies were found by the police at the Zonk’Izizwe squatter camp on 28/11/90 - all with gun wounds. In Alexandra a burnt body of a man was found and another man was seriously injured in Soweto when a mob fired shots.

In Katlehong 10 bodies were found at the Mandela Park squatter camp; seven died from gunshot wounds, two were hacked to death and another was beheaded. (The Star 29/12/1990)

Curfews were imposed on four Reef townships on 3/12/1990 as police reported the death toll had risen to at least 71 in the latest outbreak of violence. Police said 51 bodies were found in Thokoza, 8 in Tembisa, 6 in Katlehong, since violence erupted on Sunday 2/12/90 in the three East Rand townships. The following areas were declared unrest areas: Thokoza, Katlehong, Vosloorus and Bekkersdal. (The Citizen 4/12/1990)

In Bekkersdal a body of a 16-year-old boy was discovered bringing the death toll in the area to 10. (The Citizen 11/12/1990)
Fifteen people are arrested outside Sebokeng hostel on Sunday 9/12/1990 for possession of firearms, ammunition, handgrenades and petrol bombs. (The Citizen 11/12/90)

Fifteen Inkatha members charged with possession of firearms, ammunition, handgrenades and petrol bombs are granted bail of R200 each on 12/12/1990. (The Sowetan 13/12/90)

The death toll in fighting on the Reef and in the Vaal Triangle rose to at least 175 since December 2. On 17/12/1990 five decomposed bodies were found in Bekkersdal. (The Citizen 18/12/90)

There is evidence emerging that access to AK 47 rifles in the townships is becoming easier. According to sources, the four men arrested in connection with a major weapons haul at a Thokoza hostel at the weekend have Inkatha links. Eighteen AK 47 rifles along with a number of pistols were seized at the weekend at Thokoza hostel where the SACC delegation was refused entry on 12/12/1990. (The Citizen 18/12/1990).
Introduction:

Violence erupted in the Vaal Triangle, on 12/1/1991 when 38 people were gunned down at the night vigil for Christoffel Nangalembe in Sebokeng. Nangalembe was at the time of his death a member of the ANC’s anti-crime campaign. Nangalembe was abducted on January 5 and his body was later discovered on a rubbish dump in Boipatong.

Sporadic violence continues in Natal, but hopes of a peaceful resolution to the conflict have been raised by reports that a high ranking ANC delegation headed by ANC deputy president Nelson Mandela is to meet the president of the Inkatha Freedom Party on January 29, 1991.

More vigilante attacks were reported from Braklaagte in Bophuthatswana. The latest outbreak of violence occurred soon after the midnight launching of an ANC branch in the area. The torching of the Johannesburg local office of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) on 14/1/1991, has once again raised fears that unions are being targeted for informal repression.
On the positive side, Justice Kriegler's judgment has raised new questions regarding the findings of the Harms Commission relating to SAP hit squads.

1. SEBOKENG

The Board was requested to assist in the investigation into the Sebokeng vigil massacre. Several statements have been collected and a special briefing document has been prepared. However, the Board's attorneys consider the information too sensitive to be released at this stage due to the fact that people's lives may be in danger. Nevertheless, it has been established that a gang operating in the area is implicated in the killings. The gang has had an ongoing feud with local ANC members since early March 1990.

The IBIIR has established in its investigations that the local Sebokeng police were notified at least three days before the impending attack on the vigil and that Mandla Nangalembe, brother of the deceased, Christoffel Nangalembe, was being followed and strange men had been seen driving past his house in different cars.
He furnished the SAP with the registration numbers of two of the cars: a Ford Granada FSX 044T and a red Datsun Pulsar HCB 466T.

On January 10, 1991, Mandla Nangalembe telephoned Colonel Mazibuko of the Sebokeng police station and told him that there were strange people around the house and that he felt threatened. On the same day, members of the SAP, came to the house and took Mandla Nangalembe to the police statement where he gave a full statement and furnished them with the details of the cars for the second time. During the course of the conversation, a certain policeman identified as Konnig from the CID, Vanderbijlpark, told him that he lost the piece of paper with the car registrations which he had taken the previous day. Konnig then said to Nangalembe that he would visit him again to get the numbers but Nangalembe never saw him again.

At 9h00 on the same day Colonel Mazibuko instructed Konnig to ensure that the Nangalembe house was secure and to investigate the case.
On January 11, Mandla Nangalembe called in church fieldworkers, Saul Tsotetsi, Reverend Peter Moerane and the Reverend Moabi. At 16h30 on the same day the Reverend Moerane telephoned Colonel Mazibuko, and was informed that the Colonel had left. He then spoke to the person responsible for the police station, Sergeant Makgethe. He told him that gangsters were patrolling the area and that he was concerned that they would mount an attack on the vigil that night. He also told the police the group was dangerous and heavily armed. Sergeant Makgethe gave Reverend Moerane a code number 16I.B, which left no doubt in the Reverend’s mind that a unit would be sent to the vigil.

It is unclear as to whether the SAP were patrolling the area. People at the vigil say there was no police presence at the vigil, but according to a press report in Business Day 14/1/91, the police had come to the vigil and had been told by marshalls that they were not welcome.

One of the cars whose registration number was furnished to the police by Mandla Nangalembe, a Ford Granada FSX 044T, was identified by marshalls at the vigil as being involved in the attack in the early hours of 12/1/91.
In light of the above allegations, a Colonel Williams has been appointed to head an internal investigation as to why the alleged threats were not taken seriously by the police. The Board’s investigations in this area are continuing.

2. BRAKLAAGTE

The Transvaal Rural Action Committee (Trac) under the auspices of the Black Sash requested the IBIIR staff to assist them in the investigation into alleged police misconduct and vigilante attacks in the Braklaagte area. The resurgence of violence in the area coincided with the formal launch of three ANC structures in the area. Within 10 days of the launching, five people were reported to have died in conflict allegedly triggered by vigilantes who support President Lucas Mangope.

On the 11th and 12th of January 1991, an employee of the Board went to Ikalelegeng, a township near Zeerust where members of the Braklaagte community had fled following the vigilante and police attacks.
Statements from various victims and eyewitnesses who were either assaulted or witnessed an assault. The statements have been handed to the Board's attorneys for further action.

3. NUMSA

The offices of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) Johannesburg local which represents 35,000 members at about 600 factories was gutted as a result of an incident of arson. Over 50 violent attacks against union property and personnel have been reported since October 1985. These include bombings, arson, vandalism and assaults on trade union personnel. The IBIIR was requested by Numsa to investigate the fire. The Board found that the arsonist(s) had gained entry by force and that many of the filing cabinets had been forced open and the membership files had been removed. The area that the sustained the most damage was the central administrative section.

The Board's assessment that the fire at the Numsa Johannesburg local was deliberate is borne out by the police opening an arson docket.
4. THE JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF LT. GENERAL NEETHLING V THE VRYE WEEKBLAD AND THE WEEKLY MAIL:

Following articles printed in the Vrye Weekblad of 17/11/1989 and 1/12/1989 and the Weekly Mail of 24/11/1989 containing allegations by Dirk Coetzee that Lt. General Neethling, director of the Police Forensic Laboratory in Pretoria had supplied Coetzee with poison to kill ANC activists, the General sued the newspapers for a sum of R1,5 million. The IBIIIR assisted the newspapers' legal team by supplying them with all the information the Board had compiled prior to and during the Harms Commission. In fact, much of the evidence which corroborated Coetzee's account was evidence collected by the Board.

After hearing the evidence of Dirk Coetzee in London in October 1990 before commissioner Sean Naidoo, in which Dirk Coetzee repeated the allegations, the case opened in Johannesburg on November 12, 1990 before Justice Kriegler.
The policemen who gave evidence in the trial were Neethling, ex-police commissioner General Mike Geldenhuys and ex-security police major Archie Flemington. Flemington had been the commander of the Komatipoort security branch where it was alleged the bodies of ANC activists, who had been administered poison allegedly supplied by Neethling, were burnt and disposed of. Neethling denied that he had ever given Coetzee poison. He also denied that Coetzee had ever been to his house or his office in his presence, despite the fact that Coetzee had given accurate descriptions of both the house and the office in his evidence in London. Final argument in the case was delivered on December 3.

Justice Kriegler delivered a lengthy judgment on January 17 and 18 1991. he found that the articles printed in Vrye Weekblad were true and in the public interest and that while the truth of the allegation printed in the Weekly Mail had not been proved, the public interest in the issue was sufficient to defend the charge of defamation.

He also found that all three police witnesses were dishonest in varying degrees. Specifically he found that Neethling had misled both this court and the Harms Commission.
In light of the fact that Justice Harms dismissed most of the allegations against the police on the grounds that Dirk Coetzee was an unreliable witness, Justice Kriegler’s finding casts serious doubts on the Commission’s findings. Not only did Justice Kriegler find that Coetzee was a truthful witness but also that Neethling had deliberately misled the Harms Commission. As the issue of police hit squads is one of prime public concern the contradictions between the Kriegler judgment and the Harms Commission findings must be settled. The Board thus joins a number of other organisations in calling for the re-opening of the investigation into the Coetzee allegations.

5. RIGHTWING

In the last two months a definitive shift in rightwing politics has emerged. Three important areas are highlighted namely, incidents, government clampdowns, and future talks. A detailed study of the rightwing for the months of December and January is underway and will supplement this brief outline.
Incidents: The rightwing has suffered several vitriolic attacks by the press because of the nature of the incidents in which they were involved.

A group of whites attacked about 100 Blacks for swimming in a white area near Vanderbijlpark on New Year's day. The victims including 30 children, were all members of the Voice of Healing Church in Sebokeng. (Sowetan 23/01/91)

A 15-year-old farm labourer Frank Makwatie had petrol poured on him and set alight by Messina farmer who accused the boy of stealing his gun. The farmers had not yet been arrested. (City Press 17/12/90)

Four white men were arrested after they allegedly assaulted Blacks with sjamboks and sticks at the taxi rank in Potgietersrus. (The Citizen 17/12/1990)

The rightwing is actively involved in the recruitment of members and feel that certain actions by people within their ranks might be counter-productive. So for example Hendrik Steyn (30), a mine captain, was arrested in connection with a bomb blast in Welkom. Although he is an alleged member of the AWB, Blikkies Blignaut, Goldfields AWB leader denied this and added that the bombing was senseless.
He said Steyn was a member of the Blanke Veiligheid and not the AWB. In return, Dirk Naude, spokesperson for Blanke Veiligheid, denied this saying "the AWB mustn’t try saddle us with their fleas". (The Citizen 12/6/91)

Government Clampdown: The security police, in a series of arrests on rightwing leaders, (the clampdown really started with the arrest of the elusive Piet "Skiet" Rudolph and continues to the present day) have shaken up the rightwing. They now realise that the state is taking their threats of violence seriously.
Rightwing security is considerably tighter. Sometimes they ask for references from aspiring members; access to training sessions is becoming increasingly difficult - and they have generally become more secretive.

FUTURE TALKS: The rightwing is becoming increasingly uneasy as the 1st of February approaches and future talks with the ANC regarding a new constitution are drawing closer. They believe President De Klerk is about to announce further reforms including the scrapping of the Group Areas Act. Eugene Terre‘Blanche (leader of the AWB) has said on a number of occasions that war with the government is imminent.
Rightwing organisations across the board are waiting for the opening-of-parliament speech as the incident which will galvanise them into large scale and sustained military action. Although this seems highly unlikely one can expect an increase in random terrorist attacks in reaction to what they perceive as the final government capitulation.

6. NATAL

There is renewed optimism in Natal that the talks scheduled between a high powered ANC delegation and the president of the Inkatha Freedom Party on January 29, 1991 may lead to peaceful resolution to the violence both on the Reef and in Natal.

Africa Watch, a human rights organisation, in a 63-page report has accused the security forces of fanning political violence. "South African Police have enhanced the violence by favouring the Inkatha side ... in its struggle with the ANC and its allies." The report further states that the police "transported Inkatha vigilantes in police vehicles, shooting and killing unarmed residents, burning and looting homes and using tear-gas and bullets to prevent residents from defending themselves."
A second, 36-page report released by a three person mission of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) falls in line with the Africa Watch report which claims police partiality in the violence.

Currently, tension is high at Umgababa, on the Natal South Coast, where 17 people were reported killed in fierce fighting on Friday 11/1/1991. Four busloads, of Inkatha supporters from Hlanzeni, allegedly attacked residents of Amagcino who it is claimed are pro-ANC. Six bodies were found on Friday, and a further eight on Sunday. By Sunday, 13/1/1991, 6,000 people had left their homes and had sought refuge at the Umgababa holiday resort.

According to an eyewitness who refused to be identified: "The whole thing started when a local chief did not want "comrades" and said he would not tolerate people who wore ANC T-shirts". Inkatha leaders in the area claim that the attacks were reprisals by frustrated residents because young ANC "comrades" had spearheaded a campaign to isolate chiefs in the area.
In another incident, Inkatha member, Jeffrey Mkhwanazi, claims that he was stabbed 14 times by UDF supporters and saved by police. He alleges that the attack was a revenge attack on Inkatha members by UDF supporters who had been previously attacked by Inkatha.

7. ATTACKS ON INDIVIDUALS

7.1 CHRIS DLAMINI

Cosatu vice-president, and commissioner of the Human Rights Commission (HRC) has become the latest victim of an intimidation campaign against unions and unionists.

The latest incident occurred on the 17/1/1991 when four men, who refused to be identify themselves, entered Cosatu’s Germiston office in search of Dlamini and the Cosatu regional administrator. One was later seen loading a gun inside the building. This not the first time that Dlamini has been harassed. Last January he received a call from a man saying: "You have been warned quite a number of times you mustn’t think we are playing. We have now reached a stage where we must act."
Earlier, he received a letter containing a small coffin and a death threat. This was followed by a letter warning that "The time has come when you must be, eliminated" and a visit to his home by three whites and two blacks claiming to be policemen. Cosatu in a statement released after the latest incident said: "We remain convinced that elements of the security forces, the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) and other agencies of apartheid terror continue on a war footing against the democratic movement."

The incident involving Dlamini comes hot on the heels of the arson attack on Numsa's Johannesburg local office. Numsa also claims that the attack had been carried out by the CCB. The claim is fuelled by the fact that none of the members of the Johannesburg cell of the CCB are in custody despite evidence led at the Harms Commission that they were involved in an active campaign against Cosatu and its affiliates.
7.2 BHEKI MKHIZE

Bheki Mkhize, the president of the National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union (Nehawu) and a member of the sub-committee of the National Working Committee on Violence was recently attacked on his way home to Soweto.

He claims that on 18/12/1990 an attempt was made on his life. He was on his way home when a yellow car passed him and stopped in front of the gates to his home. Mkhize went to his neighbours house and he asked that a women staying there take down the registrations number of the car. As the woman attempted to do this the car sped away. Mkhize went home, however, as he entered the street a white car came speeding towards him and attempted run him over.

8. THE CIVIL CO-OPERATION BUREAU (CCB)

8.1 Edward Gordon, known as "peaches", who was hired by the CCB to eliminate Cape attorney Dullah Omar and for other CCB inspired operations was found dead on 12/1/1990 near Langa in the Cape.
Gordon - who admitted to the Harms Commission that he had conned the CCB out of R25 000 (money he was paid to complete CCB operations) received death threats on the Friday before his murder.

8.2 In another incident related to the CCB, former agent and Irish national, Donald Acheson who was held in Namibia for eight months on suspicion of murdering Swapo member Anton Lubowski claims that he was sent to Namibia to eliminate the editor of The Namibian, Gwen Lister. Acheson further claims that he had nothing to do with the Lubowski assassination.

9. **ASKARIS**

9.1 The deployment of Askaris, (turned ANC and PAC guerrillas), at airports is nit "unusual" according to the South African Police (SAP). The increasing use of Askaris at airports has led to several ANC and PAC members being detained while attempting to enter or leave the country.
9.2 A senior ANC activist, George Nene, said he was apprehended by Askaris in Johannesburg on 15/1/91, threatened with pistols and left blindfolded in a vehicle for about two hours before being allowed to go free. Nene also alleged that the officer in charge of the Askaris introduced himself as Major Eugene de Kock. De Kock gave evidence at the Harms Commission that he was the commanding officer of section C1 of the South African Security Police, C1 being the Askari unit. Nofamela implicated De Kock in a number of illegal activities both inside and outside South Africa where a number of people were killed.

In argument at the Harms Commission the IBIIR called for the disbandment of the Askari unit as its existence was no longer necessary in the present political climate and a unit of this nature could abuse the powers available to it.

The above incidents bear out these points of argument. The Board's attorneys are in possession of a statement made by George Nene and an investigation in this regard is continuing.
10. ABDUCTIONS

A Soweto activist and member of the ANC's Zola Branch, Professor Nhlapo, was abducted outside the Roman Catholic Church in Zola on Wednesday, the 19 of December, 1990 and injected with a mysterious poisonous substance by six balaclava-clad men travelling in a minibus. The incident follows a number of death threats by mysterious people, the most recent, was when a white man called him and said he would be killed if he continued his political activities. Nhlapo believes he attracted political enemies when he testified at the inquest of activist Sicelo Dlomo who was gunned down by unknown people about two years ago.

CONCLUSION

The violence in early December was not sustained throughout the month. The Board believes that this can be attributed firstly to the fact that migrant workers, many of whom are Inkatha members went home for the festive season; and, secondly, to the announcement of a curfew being imposed on the East Rand townships as well as the deployment of the SADF's 32 Battalion in Thokoza.
The soldiers were specifically based around the Thokoza hostel and the Phola Park squatter camp, the scene of much of the violence. The SADF has been called in because of allegations by both hostel and squatter camp dwellers that the police have been actively involved in the conflict. The Board is in possession of several statements that allege that the SAP in the area have supported Inkatha and have, on many occasions, been involved in attacks on Phola Park residents.

Claims that the arson attack on the Numsa Johannesburg local and the incident in Germiston on Chris Dlamini, were carried out by the CCB, need to be taken seriously by the Board. Members of the Johannesburg cell of the CCB are still on the loose and there has been no proof that the CCB has been disbanded. Witnesses testifying at the Harms Commission said that the CCB saw Cosatu and its affiliates, officials and members as the "enemy" and therefore "legitimate" targets. These attacks point to a renewed campaign of intimidation against the union movement.

Numsa claims that since July 1990, workers in the Vaal, many of them Numsa members, have been the targets of at least 15 attacks, resulting in 60 deaths.
Many of the attacks were directed at the huge Sebokeng hostel complex. Numsa’s Crisis Unit co-ordinator Alf Woodington says Inkatha supporters have undoubtedly had a role in the violence. Woodington also concedes that criminals have also been involved – notably in the vigil killings of 12/1/91 in Sebokeng.

The Board believes that it would be unwise to attribute these killings to a fued between gang members and "comrades". It is distinctly possible that an additional force working with the gang behind the scenes may have taken advantage of the conflict.